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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF ADVERTISING
By JOSEPH S. FREELAND*
I
So rapid, in recent years, has been the development of the
art of advertising, and so great has become its importance as a
factor in the economic scheme, that it is not surprising that
legal questions of considerable interest have developed in con-
nection therewith. Even the most casual observer of the economic
scene cannot help but note the tremendous effect which the adroit
and skillful appeals at present practiced by the exponents of the
art exercise upon mass buying habits and, through these, upon
the economic structure as a whole. Never before, surely, in the
history of the human race has there been seen the spectacle of
whole populations buying and using commodities which they,
without some external pressure, would not want, and which in
many instances are either absolutely worthless or definitely
deleterious to the health and welfare of the consumer.' Through
print, billboards, and the radio the American people (to say
nothing of the less fortunate races whom necessity forces to
reside in foreign parts) are exposed to a constant flood of psy-
chological suggestions, entreaties, and commands to purchase
this or that article of commerce. The combined effect is over-
whelming: millions of those whose best friends would not tell
them hasten to make themselves fragrant and beautiful; millions
of those who seek the radiant glow of health hasten to purchase
the latest product of the breakfast food institutes; millions more
who shudder lest they fall behind in the transportation parade
hasten to equip themselves with the newest creation of the
Detroit assembly lines. Economic crisis has only served to
intensify the process; it has heightened the competition among
advertisers for a greater share of the consumer's shrunken
dollar.
Nor is this all. Advertising has created and now sustains
social institutions of the greatest importance. Such powerful
*LL. B., Univ. of Ky. 1938; now practicing law in Paducah, Ky.
1 See any issue of the monthly bulletins published by Consumers'
Research or Consumers' Union.
K. L. J.-3
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molders of public opinion as the daily press,2 the group of
weekly periodicals typified by the Saturday Evening Post, and
the radio broadcasting industry, could scarcely exist were it not
for the life-giving flow of advertising revenue; without it they
would annually run a deficit which would make that of the
federal government seem scarcely worth worrying about.
Furthermore, advertising has created vested interests of con-
siderable power and tenacity, which, because of the hold a
popularized trade name has upon the public mind, in many
cases approach monopoly.3 Every student of business practices
is familiar with the capitalization of intangible assets as "good
will"; although "good will" often includes other elements the
nature of which is not even remotely suggested by the term em-
ployed to cover them, "good will" nearly always includes that
yested interest in public purchasing habits which is built up by
the judicious use of advertising.4
Such considerations as these, it would seem, should be
sufficient to establish the economic importance of the art of
advertising, and therefore, it naturally follows, its legal impor-
tance as well; since litigation seems to be most plentiful where
the most money is involved. It would seem, therefore, that to
the practicing lawyer, particularly the lawyer whose clientele is
drawn from among those corporate enterprises which advertise
extensively, a knowledge of the various legal rights and liabili-
ties involved in advertising should be most important. It is with
this fact in view that this paper has been written; and although
its scope is necessarily limited to a very narrow field, that of
copyright, it may perhaps be suggestive of other problems which
lie beyond its range.
II
To what extent is advertising copyrightable? In the
United States, at least, the answer to this question very largely
2This does not, of course, apply to newspapers subsidized by
political groups from one source or another; e. g. the Communist
dailies in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, the former of which
alone, with a circulation of approximately 40,000 and almost no adver-
tising, incurs an annual deficit of $90,000.
3So much so that, in some instances, as in the case of snapshot
cameras and gelatine desserts, the trade name of the most widely
advertised brand of such products has virtually ousted the actual name
of the commodity from the average vocabulary.
4 See Veblen, The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial
Arts (1919), 71.
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turns upon the construction of a section of the United States
Constitution, for it is from that source that the power of Con-
gress to provide for the grant of copyrights and patents is
derived. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have
power5
"To promote the Progress of Science and usful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."
Thus empowered, Congress has from time to time enacted copy-
right legislation, that in force at the present time being Title 17
of the United States Code.6 The statute itself is silent on the
question of whether advertising is copyrightable ;7 the answer to
our question must therefore be sought in the pages of the
reported cases.
Generally, it appears, material which may be made the sub-
ject of copyright must possess originality,8 at least in the "legal"
sense,O and, as the foregoing section of the Constitution would
I U. S. Const. Art I, §8, c. 8.
$The act now in force is that of March 4, 1909, c. 320, as sub-
oequently amended.
7 U. S. C. A. tit. 17, §4. "The works for which copyright may be
secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author."
Id. §5. "The application for registration shall specify to which of
the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories,
gazetteers, and other compilations;
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers;(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery);
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;
(e) Musical compositions;
(f) Maps;
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art;(h) Reproductions of a work of art;(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(j) Photographs;
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations;
(1) Motion-picture photoplays;
(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays.
The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject
matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of this title, nor shall any
error in classification invalidate or impair the copyright protection
secued under this title."
"Gray v. Russell, Fed. Cas. No. 5,728 (C. C. Mass., 1839); Jollie v.
Jaques, Fed. Cas. No. 7,437 (C. C. N. Y., 1850); Hoffman v. Le Traunik,
209 Fed. 375 (N. D. N. Y., 1913); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282
Fed. '29 (C. C. A. 2d., 1922); Roe-Lawton v. Hal B. Roach Studios,
18 F. (2d) 125 (S. D. Cal., 1927).
'Boucicault v. Fox, Fed. Cas. No. 1,691 (C. C. N. Y., 1862); Hen-
derson v. Tompkins, 60 Fed. 758 (C. C. Mass., 1894); Jewelers' Circular
Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), cert.
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seem to indicate, it must bear some relation to "the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."10
The earliest American case involving the copyright of adver-
tising matter appears to be that of Collender v. Griffth,1 decided
in 1873. The plaintiff, a manaufacturer of billiard tables,
sought to restrain infringement of a copyright obtained by him
in an engraving of such a table, used for advertising purposes.
The court, though holding that there had been no infringement.,
said that "The engraving claimed to be the subject of copyright
is not a work of art, print, lithograph, or engraving having any
value or use as such. It is a mere copy of what the plaintiff
had patented as a design, and constitutes the mode in which the
complainant advertises his tables", and accordingly it should
not be copyrightable.
Following this came the case of Ehret v. Pierce,12 decided
in 1880. The plaintiff therein had copyrighted an advertising
card, of a type no doubt familiar to the reader, to which were
affixed square bits of paper colored to represent the various
colors of paints which the plaintiff offered for sale, with accom-
panying descriptive and commendatory printed matter. An
injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing similar
cards advertising his own paints was denied, the court holding
that such a card could not be the subject of copyright, not having
a book, map, chart, musical composition, print or engraving with-
in the meaning of the act of 1831.13 "True," the court observed,
"it has lithographic work upon it, and also words and sentences;
but it has none of the characteristics of a work of art or
of a literary production. It is an advertisement, and nothing
more.' 4 Furthermore, assuming that a valid copyright could
be acquired by the plaintiff, the defendant's card was not an
infringement thereon, since it did not reproduce the plaintiff's
card, but only his method of advertising. An exclusive right to
employ a particular method of advertising, the court held, can-
denied Keystone Pub. Co. v. Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co., 259 U. S. 581,
42 Sup. Ct. 464, 65 L. Ed. 1074 (1922).
0 Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U. S. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. 731, 35 L. Ed. 470
(1891); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Note
(1922) 17 A. L. R. 760, 774.
"Fed. Cas. No. 3,000 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1873).
210 Fed. 553 (C. C. E. D. N. Y., 1880).
-4 Stat. 436 (1813).
14 10 Fed. 553, 554.
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not be acquired under the copyright laws. And in Lamb v.
Grand Rapids School Furniture Co.,15 decided nine years later,
a federal circuit court in Mffichigan, refusing an injunction on
the ground that there had been no infringement of the plain-
tiff's copyright of a catalogue containing engravings of church
furniture of plaintiff's manufacture, stated that it was a matter
of so much doubt whether the engravings were intrinsically
valuable as works of art, or whether they were simply for trade
purposes in aid of sales, that an injunction ought to be denied.
In S. S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley,'0 also decided in 1889,
involving the copyright of an advertising chart of artificial teeth,
the court, without discussing the validity of the copyright, held
simply that there had been no infringement.
In Mutuial Advertising Co. v. Befo,1 the plaintiff had copy-
righted a pamphlet containing advertising and coupons which,
when presented to the merchants comprising the advertising
association, were good for certain premiums. The defendant
issued a pamphlet resembling plaintiff's in its advertising but
differing in its coupon scheme. The court held that there was
no infringement, as the advertising could not be the subject of
copyright, and the coupon scheme, which could be, was not
infringed.
In Raggins v. Keuffel,'8 a United States Supreme Court
case, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin use of a label containing the
words "waterproof drawing ink," on the grounds that they had
obtained a copyright therein under the federal statute. The
Court affirmed the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill.
The constitutional provision authorizing grants of copyrights
has no reference to labels which simply describe the articles to
which they are attached, and which have no value when
separated therefrom and no possible influence upon science or
the useful arts. "To be entitled to a copyright the article must
have by itself some value as a composition, at least to the extent
of serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or
designation of the subject to which it is attached."' 9 Even were
1539 Fed. 474 (C. C. W. D. Mich., 1889).
" 38 Fed. 751 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1889).
"776 Fed. 961 (C. C. S. C., 1896).
" 140 U. S. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. 731, 35 L. Ed. 470 (1891).
'
9 1d. at 431. The Court cited Scoville v. Toland, Fed. Cas. No. 12,
553 (C. C. Ohio, 1848), in which the court, holding that a copyright
could not be obtained in a label reading "Dr. Rodgers Compound Syrup
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such a label a proper subject of copyright, no such right was here
acquired, the Court held, since plaintiffs had failed to conform
to the statutory formalities of registration.
Although the language quoted above from the Kezffel case
seems broad enough to include all forms of advertising, it should
be noted that what was actually decided was the validity of a
copyright of a label intended to be attached or pasted to an article
intended for sale, and not an advertisement thereof in the true
sense. While, on principle, there should be no difference in the
degree of protection, if any, accorded an attractive and original
poster in a grocer's window, and the same attractive and original
design on the label of the canned product on his shelves, the
federal copyright act does differentiate between them to some
extent, requiring labels to 'be registered in the Patent Office and
specifically stating that they shall not be entered under the copy-
right law.20 Accordingly, it has been held that a copyright of
a design (the picture of a young woman) which was later
lithographed and used as a cigar box label was void as an attempt
to evade the provisions of the "print and label'' law."1
In the case of J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Glow,22 the plain-
of Liverwort and Tar. A safe and certain dure for consumption of the
lungs, spitting of blood, coughs, colds, asthma, pain in the side,
bronchitis, whooping-cough, and all pulmonary affections", said that
"As a composition distinct from the medicine [this label] can be of no
value. . . . This is not the case with other compositions which are
intended to instruct and amuse the reader, though limited to a single
sheet or page." At the present time, it might be observed, the author
of such a label would not only be denied a copyright, but would run
afoul of the Pure Food and Drug Act.
"U. S. C. A., tit. 17, §63 (June 18, 1874). In Marsh v. Warren, Fed.
Cas. No. 9,121 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1877), it was held that no person is
entitled to a copyright in any print, or label designed to be used for
any other article of manufacture than pictorial illustrations connected
with the fine arts, unless he has complied with the act of 1874 requiring
a copy of the article in which copyright is claimed to be registered in
the patent office before publication. Cf. Fargo Merc. Co. v. Brechet &
Richter Co., 295 Fed. 823 (C. C. A- 8th, 1924), holding that copyright of
a label was secured by publication with notice of copyright, followed
by registration in the patent office under the "print and label" law,
where the label was of such character as to be properly the subject of
copyright. Accord: Golden Rule, Inc. v. B. V. D. Co., 242 Fed. 929
(C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co.
(on motion) 27 F. (2d) 176 (E. D. N. Y., 1928), (same case on final
hearing) 31 F. (2d) 583 (E. D. N. Y., 1929).
21 Schumacher v. Wogram, 35 Fed. 219 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1888).
The court distinguished the case of Schumacher v. Schwencke, note 29
infra, on the ground that in that case the picture was not primarily
intended to be used as a label.
-82 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897).
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tiffs, manufacturers of various articles of necessity and con-
venience in the way of plumbing, had published and copyrighted
a catalogue containing cuts or prints representing their wares.
The defendants issued a similar catalogue purporting to
advertise their own products, but actually copying directly
several cuts or prints from plaintiff's catalogue. The court
refused to enjoin infringement of the alleged copyright. The
illustrations, the court thought, were not of subjects capable of
artistic treatment, nor was the letterpress of literary merit or
even of scientific interest, since it contained no information as to
the process of construction. The constitutional provision
relating to copyright was intended to promote the dissemination
of learning: "it is not designed as a protection to traders in the
particular manner in which they might shout their wares.''23
And in Royal Sales Co. v. Gaynor24 the court held that a mono-
gram composed of the letters "T A F T" in distinctive arrange-
ment intended for use as a campaign badge for the presidential
contest of 1908 was not copyrightable, not being a "cut, print,
or engraving," or a pictorial illustration "connected with the
fine arts" as required by the statute.
III
The first American case to intimate that advertising matter,
if of sufficient originality and artistic merit, might be the sub-
jeet of copyright, is Yuengling v. Schile.25 There the plaintiff
sought to restrain infringemnt of a copyright allegedly obtained
by him in a" chromo" entitled" Gambrinus and his followers. "26
The chromo, "designed as a symbolic glorification of lager beer
drinking," was intended by plaintiff to be used in advertising,
and was so used, having plaintiff's name printed thereon in large
letters. The defendant, a rival brewer of the foaming bock,
had promulgated a somewhat similar pictorial proclamation.
SId. at 319.
-'164 Fed. 207 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1908).
21,12 Fed. 97 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 182).
-4 Gambrinus, for the information of those whose knowledge of
beverages is more practical than theoretical, was the legendary inventor
of the Teutonic nectar, lager beer.
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Brown, J., though refusing an injunction on other grounds2 7
observed that 28
"The plaintiff's chromo in the present case is not a mere engraving
or print of any article which the complainant offers for sale. It is a
work of the imagination, and has such obvious artistic qualities as,
in my judgment, render it fairly a subject of copyright, without regard
to the use which the plaintiff has made or may intend to make of it.
When the work in question is clearly one of artistic merit, it is not
material, in my judgment, whether the person claiming a copyright
expects to obtain his reward directly through a sale of the copies, or
indirectly through an increase of profits to be obtained through its
gratuitous distribution."
In Schumacher v. Schwencke29 an injunction was actually
granted against infringement of a copyright obtained by the
complainant in a painting of a newsboy with a cigar stub in his
mouth, lithographed copies of the same having been sold for use
as cigar box labels. It was not established, however, that this
was the sole use intended to be made of the painting, and there
was, in fact, evidence to the contrary. The court, observing that
the subject of the copyright was a painting, executed with con-
siderable artistry, and of itself entitled to copyright, said that
"The fact that copies may be utilized for advertising purposes
does not change the character of the original.'' 3
It remained, however, for the Supreme Court, in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,31 to establish definitely, in the
face of virtually all the prior law on the subject, that advertising
may be the subject of copyright. In that case the plaintiffs had
copyrighted 32 three circus posters of the customary gaudiness of
" These being that, first, there was no showing that plaintiff held
his copyright under the original author of the chromo, it being only
"authors and inventors" who under the Constitution are directly
entitled to copyright; and, second, that there was no infringement,
since it did not appear that defendant had copied plaintiff's picture,
but that both had copied the same foreign original, which was not
copyrighted.
2 Id. at 100.
125 Fed. 466 (C. 0. S. D. N. Y., 1885).
*Id. at 467.
1188 U. S. 239, 23 Sup. Ct. 298, 47 L. Ed. 460 (1918).
11 Under the provisions of the former statute on the subject, Rev.
Stat. §4952 (1875). The pertinent section reads as follows: "Sec. 4952.
The author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book, map, chart,
dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph
or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary,
and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine
arts, and the executors, administrators, or assigns of any such person
shall, upon complying with the provisions of this chapter, have the
sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying,
executing, finishing, and vending the same.... In the construction of
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color and extravagance of design, representing respectively a
ballet, a trick bicycle act, and a group of "living statues", all
intended as advertisements of acts performed by persons con-
nected with the Wallace Shows. An action was brought by the
plaintiffs to recover the statutory damages for infringement.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the
trial court,33 had held3" that this material was not copyrightable,
since as a "mere advertisement" it was not "promotive of the
useful arts" within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The court cited and followed J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow,35
and distinguished Yveizgling v. Scile36 and Schumacher v.
Schweneke.
3 7
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, this
Judgment was reversed (Justices Harlan and McKenna dis-
senting), and the posters were held copyrightable. Said
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court :3s
"The act, however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters
are not good enough to be considered within its scope. The antithesis
to 'Illustrations or works connected with the fine arts' is not works of
little merit or of humble degree, or illustrations addressed to the less
educated classes; it is 'prints or labels designed to be used for any
other articles of manufacture.' Certainly works are not the less
connected with the fine arts because their pictorial quality attracts
the crowd and therefore gives them a real use-if use means to increase
trade and to help to make money. A picture is none the less a picture
and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for an
advertisement."
It is now well recognized that the Bleistein case established
a new rule in regard to the copyright of advertising, although
for some time thereafter the courts tended to attempt to dis-
tinguish the older cases and explain them away.3 9  For illustra-
tion, there is the case of Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Giulinani
Statulary Co.,40 wherein the plaintiff, having copyrighted its
this act the words 'engraving', 'cut', and 'print' shall be applied only to
pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts, and no
prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture
shall be entered under the copyright law, but may be registered in the
patent office."
198 Fed. 608 (C. C. Ky., 1898).
"Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104




188 U. S. 239, 251.
"Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. '760, 774.
11 189 Fed. 90 (C. C. Minn., 1911).
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catalogue containing photographic illustrations of church stat-
uary which it offered for sale, sought to enjoin infringement
if its copyright by the defendant, which had copied some of
plaintiff's cuts in its own catalogue. The court held that the
illustrations were proper subjects of copyright, citing the Bleis-
tein case. Iron 'Works v. 0low4 1 was distinguished, the court
saying that "the objects there illustrated [wash bowl, bath tub,
slop jar, etc.] are very different from the objects illustrated in
the calalogue in this case. '"42 Aside from the sacred purposes
to which church statuary is dedicated, it does not seem that the
difference referred to by the court is necessarily very great;
it has been the experience of the writer that much church statuary
is as highly conventionalized and as lacking in real artistic merit
or distinction as the bathroom appliances vended by the plain-
tiff in the Clow case; and it is, of course, relation to the useful
arts, and not dedication to sacred purposes, which renders a
work copyrightable. It would appear, therefore, that the earlier
cases have, in effect, been overruled.
IV
Since Bleistein v. Donaldson Iiithographing Co. there have
been a number of decisions in which the federal courts have up-
held the validity of advertising copyrights. In National Cloak
aund Suit Co. v. Kaufman,43 the court, sustaining a copyright of a
publication containing fashion plates used as advertisements,
cited the Bleistein case as denying the defendant's contention
that if a picture has no other use than that of a "mere advertise-
ment", and no value aside from the function, it would not be
promotive of the useful arts within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, although it was said in the opinion that the plaintiff's
pictures were more than "mere advertisements" of wearing
apparel, having recognizable artistic merit.
Similarly, in J. H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro4 4 the de-
fendant's contention was that a catalogue of brass electric fix-
tures was merely a trade list of articles of general merchandise,
and as such not a proper subject for copyright protection. The
"I Supra, note 22.
2189 Fed. 90, 93.
189 Fed. 215 (C. C. M. D. Pa., 1911).
227 Fed. 957 (S. D. N. Y., 1915).
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court held the illustrations copyrightable, relying on the Bleistein
ease. Augustus N. Hand, J., said: "These decisions [Lamb v.
Furniture Co. and Iron Works. v. Clow] are not without much
basis in reason; but I cannot see that distinction made by them
in respect to catalogues for advertising is warranted by the strict
language of the statute . . .Neither the merit nor the purpose
of the print seems to be regarded by the language of the act." 45
Thus, the court in Stacher Lithographic Co. v. Dunston
Lihographic Co.4 3 granted an injunction and accounting on a
copyright obtained by the plaintiff therein in certain chromos
or lithographs of ordinary garden vegetables (carrots, beats, etc.)
which were used for advertising purposes. Defendant had a
right to make lithographs of the identical vegetables, and to use
them for advertising purposes, but it had no right to adopt
plaintiff's copyrighted portrayals. "It makes no difference that
the pictures in suit are intended for advertising articles of com-
merce . . . or that they possessed little artistic merit."4 7 The
court further held that the "print and label" law (Section 3 of
the Act of 1874)48 does not apply to chromos, but only to "en-
gravings, cuts, and prints", and that therefore it was not neces-
sary that plaintiff have registered its copyright in the Patent
Office. In Golden Rule, Inc. v. B. V. D. Co.,49 decided in 1917,
wherein the plaintiff had copyrighted a print of a youthful
Adonis wearing a suit of the underwear manufactured by plain-
tiff and had used the print for advertising purposes, the court
ruled that the validity of the copyright was not in issue upon the
pleadings, and held that the copyright had been infringed.
The question was again presented to the Supreme Court in
the case of L. A. Westerrnan Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co.,70
where the plaintiff, having copyrighted pictures of women's
styles for newspaper advertising, sued for damages for infringe-
ment of the copyright. The Court did not discuss the validity of
the copyright, but necessarily assumed it in holding that the
defendant was liable.
'Id. at 958.
11233 Fed. 601 (W. D. N. Y., 1916).
41 Id. at 603.
'U. S. C. A., tit. 17, §63; see supra note 20.
49242 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
&1249 U. S. 100, 39 Sup. Ct. 194, 63 L. Ed. 499 (1919).
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Again, in Campbell v. Wireback,5 1 where the plaintiffs had
copyrighted catalogues of orthopedic devices 52 manufactured by
them, which catalogues were tastefully illustrated by engravings
of these products (which must have been of considerable interest
to the public, in view of the then recent conclusion of the Great
War), it was held that the illustrations were copyrightable, it
appearing that they had been executed by persons of "skill and
artistic capacity." From this it might be inferred that had the
engravings been the work of unskilled persons of no artistic
capacity, they would not have been copyrightable. Such a con-
clusion, if that is what the court meant, would seem entirely
incorrect, in view of the Bleistein and later cases, in which the
courts have upheld the validity of copyrights of circus posters,
of ordinary photographs of brass electric fixtures53 and of
statuary,54 and of lithographs of common or garden vegeta-
bles.5 5 It seems safe to say that had the plaintiff in Campbell v.
Wireback copyrighted photographs of its products taken by an
office boy of ordinary ability rather than engravings made by
persons of "skill and artistic capacity" the copyright thus
secured would have been sustained by the courts.
V
Thus far, it will have been observed, the cases which have
been discussed in which advertising has been held a proper sub-
ject of copyright have all been cases in which the copyrighted
matter has been of a pictorial or illustrative nature. That letter-
press used for advertising is copyrightable has not been so
clear,56 but there appears little reason for making a distinction.
It would appear that the right to copyright advertising letter-
press would be most valuable where a manufacturer or dealer
has made use of advertising containing striking or original
phraseology of information which is of intrinsic value in addition
to its selling effect. Such a case was No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co.
v. Norris,57 where the plaintiff had compiled a pamphlet contain-
5' 269 Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
r-Artificial legs, to the non-orthopedic laity.
1 J. H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, supra note 44.
54Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Giuliani Statuary Co., supra note 40.
r Stecher Lith. Co. v. Dunston Lith. Co., supra note 46.
rNote (1922) 17 A. L. R. 760, 774.
57277 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921).
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ing a list of the different makes of automobiles, with the size and
type of piston ring required for each, designed primarily for
advertising purposes but necessarily containing much technical
information of use in repair shops and garages, and had copy-
righted the same. To detect infringements, the plaintiff em-
ployed the interesting device of including in the list certain
fictitious non-existing "trap" models, and caught defendant in
the trap. It was held that the pamphlet was subject to copy-
right, being an original compilation of useful facts from primary
sources, and much more than an ordinary price list.
In Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brichet and Richter Co.5s the
plaintiff claimed copyright in a label on which was printed a
fanciful emblem, the plaintiff's name, other printed advertising
matter, and certain recipes for using plaintiff's product. The in-
fringement complained of was the copying of these recipes by the
defendant. Further infringement was restrained by the court
and damages awarded. It was doubted whether that part of
the label containing the emblem, etc., was copyrightable, this
being a "mere advertisement"; but the court held that clearly
the recipes were copyrightable, being "original compositions"
which "scrve a useful purpose, apart from the mere advertise-
ment of the article itself." While the decision is doubtless
correct in sustaining the copyright of the recipes, the language
of the court is just as clearly wrong when it speaks of a "mere
advertisement" as being uneopyrightable; such language harks
back to the earlier decisions prior to the Bleiestsin case, which
have now been virtually repudiated. It may well have been that
the court in speaking thus was regarding the "emblem" referred
to in the reported case as something in the nature of a trade
mark. However, it was subsequently held in Hoague-Sprague
Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co.5, that the inclusion of a trade
mark as part of an advertisement or label does not prevent the
acquisition of a copyright to the whole. Sustaining a copyright
of a shoe box label which it called artistically designed, the court
in that case further said :60
"If, however, there was any doubt about that statement, i. e., that
the label was of original and artistic design, the copyright would still
be valid, as it clearly is not a copy of any of the prior art offered in
'295 Fed. 823 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
27 F. (2d) 176 (on motion, E. D. N. Y.. 1928); 31 F. (2d) 583
(on final hearing, E. D. N. Y., 1928).
"31 F. (2d) 583, 586.
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evidence, and the originality required in case of copyright means little
more than a prohibition of actual copying."
Such a view was also taken by the court in Avsehl v. Puritanz
Pharmaceutical Co.,61 in which the plaintiff had copyrighted a
newspaper advertisement consisting of photographs of toilet
articles symmetrically arranged, with accompanying laudatory
letterpress. The copyright was sustained as to the whole
advertisement. The opinion includes an exhaustive review of
the authorities, and recognizes that the Bleistein case "established
a new and liberal standard with respect to the originality or
artistic merit required to entitle illustrated advertising matter-
now frequently referred to as 'commercial art'-to the pro-
tection of copyright statutes.'"62
VI
The English cases bearing on the subject of copyright of
advertisements should be of interest to the American student of
the problem, although it should be observed that that problem is
not the same in the two countries. Because the power of Parlia-
ment to enact copyright legislation is not, as in the United States,
restricted by constitutional provisions, there is no requirement
that copyrighted material bear any relation to "science and the
useful arts", and all that appears to be required is some slight
degree of originality.6 3 It would be expected, therefore, that the
British courts would experience less difficulty than those of the
United States in holding advertising copyrightables, and such,
in fact, has been the case.
Earliest of the English cases appears to be Hottez v.
Arthur,64 decided in 1863. The plaintiff, a bookseller, had copy-
righted a catalogue of "old and curious books", which contained
not only a list of the books but also accounts of their histories and
contents and anecdotes respecting them, all these being, accord-
61 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); cert. denied 287 U. S. 655, 53
Sup. Ct. 224, 77 L. Ed. 574 (1932). Discussed in' (1932) 46 Harv. L.
Rev. 332; (1933) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 827; (1933) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 327.
"Id. at 134.
0 Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 760, 774. It is interesting to note that
the court in J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, supra note 22, distinguished
the English cases on this ground, i. e., that the British Parliament,
unlike Congress, is restrained by no constitutional provisions on the
subjects of patents and copyrights.
I 1 Hem. & M. 603, 71 Eng. Rep. 264 (Ch. 1863).
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ing to the plaintiff, "the emanations of his own mind" and
original with him. The court enjoined infringement of the copy-
right. The catalogue was not "mere dry lists of books" but
contained material of intrinsic value which was the result of
mental exertion and therefore copyrightable. Nor, the court
opined, was it any defense that the copyrighted work was not
itself offered for sale, but was merely used to promote the sale
of the books mentioned in it.
In Cobbett v. Woodward, however, where the plaintiff had
copyrighted a catalogue containing engravings of furniture sold
by him, with descriptive remarks thereon, the court refused to
restrain the defendant from publishing a similar work in which
many of plaintiff's engravings and a portion of his letterpress
was copied outright. There is no copyright in an advertisement,
the court held, and an injunction will not lie to restrain imitation
of one except where the defendant attempts to pass off his goods
as those of the plaintiff. This was merely an "illustrated inven-
tory" of the plaintiff's goods, and the law, since it allows the
defendant to sell the same articles, allows him to use the same
advertisement. As to the letterpress, wherever it "bears the
trace of original composition, it is entitled to protection, but not
where it simply describes the contents of a warehouse, the
exertions of the proprietor, or the common mode of using famil-
iar articles. "66 Hotten v. Arthur67 was not cited by counsel or
referred to by the court, and appears to have been completely
overlooked.
Three years later, in Grace v. Newman, 68 the English court,
relying on Hotten v. Arthur and declining to follow Cobbett v.
Woodward, sustained the validity of a copyright of a catalogue
containing sketches of tombstones and intended to advertise the
work of a monument mason. Since the court did not specifically
overrule Gobbett v. Woodward, the English law reamained in a
state of uncertainty until the decision in Maple and Co. v. Junior
Armny and Navy Stores, ' which sustained a copyright of an
illustrated furniture advertising catalogue. Overruling Cobbett
v. Woodward, the court held that advertising is copyrightable;
L. R. 14 Eq. 407 (1872).
Id. at 414.
Supra, note 64.
L. R. 19 Eq. 623 (1875).
*21 Ch. D. 369 (1882). Accord: Davis v. Benjamin, [1906] 2 Ch. 491.
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that "originality", not skill or merit, is the test whether a work
is subject to copyright. A directory consisting of a collection of
advertisements was held copyrightable in Lamb v. Evans,70 but
the court held that only the copyright of the headings was in the
publisher, that of the advertisements themselves being in the
advertisers. Otherwise, the court said, those who advertise for
situations in the Times could not lawfully advertise in any other
paper. Although the English cases seem to deal primarily with
the copyright of catalogues, it appears also that advertising
posters should be copyrightable in that country.7 1 However,
"cut-out" advertising show cards reproduced by litography
have been held not to be copyrightable, being designs intended
to be multiplied by an identical process and therefore capable of
registration under the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, so that
the Copyright Act of 1911 does not apply to them. 72
VII
In general, the problems arising out of infringement of
advertising copyrights and the solutions of those problems are
sufficiently similar to the problems presented by infringement of
other copyrights and the solutions thereof as to require little
special study. However, some of the holdings of the courts in
regard to infringement of advertising copyrights present dis-
tinctive features which should be of interest to the student of
the subject. For example, it has been held no infringement of a
copyright of an advertising card (with attached squares of
paper to represent various colors of paints) to publish a similar
card advertising one's own paints; this being a duplication, not
of the plaintiff's card, but only of his method of advertising.73
An exclusive right to employ a particular method of advertising
cannot be acquired under the copyright laws. So, where the
defendant did not copy plaintiff's dental advertising chart, but
simply employed the same plan of advertising his own manu-
factu-es, there was no infringement; the plaintiff could not
secure a monopoly of this plan through copyright.74 Copyright
' [1892] 3 Ch. 462.
Copinger, The Law of Copyright (7th ed., 1936) 67.
Con Planck, Ltd. v. Kolynox, Inc., [1925] 2 K. B. 804.
-Ehret v. Pierce, 10 Fed. 553 (C. C. E. D. N. Y., 1880).
4 S. S. White Dental Supply Co. v. Sibley, 38 Fed. 751 (C. C. E. D.
N. Y., 1889).
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of a catalogue containing cuts of designs for letterheads, etc.,
could not have the effect of prohibiting publication of other cata-'
logues containing cuts of designs; the plaintiff could not copy-
right a system or method of selling a product, but could-only
copyright a set of original symbols or designs used to effect
sales. 75
Furthermore, there is no infringement where both the copy-
righted matter and that allegedly infringing thereon were both
copied or adapted from a common uncopyrighted source and the
defendant did not in fact copy the plaintiff's advertisement.7 6
The same is true where the defendant's work is an independent
effort from the same general instructions as those given the
plaintiff, and neither in fact copied from the other.77 And there
is, of course, no infringement where the defendant does not copy
plaintiff's advertisement, but while ignorant of its existence
makes one of his own which is similar.78 But the defendant is
guilty of infringement where he copies from the work of another
who in turn has copied the copyrighted work of the plaintiff,
even though the defendant has no knowledge that such is the
fact.79
Of course, where the copyrighted advertisement (if a
picture) represents some actual, visible person or thing; the
plaintiff cannot monopolize the right to picture it; the defendant
may make his own reproduction of the original, being precluded
only from copying that of the plaintiff.8 0 "Others are free to
copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy. '"8' It ap-
pears also that where the defendant has an equal right with the
plaintiff to manufacture or sell the identical goods the advertise-
ment of which plaintiff has copyrighted, it is no infringement
for the defendant to publish his own advertisement illustrating
his own goods, providing his illustrations are not in fact copied
1 Kaeser & Blair v. Merchants' Assn., 64 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th,
1933).
"T Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. 97 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1882).
T1 McCarthy v. L. Adler Bros. & Co., 227 Fed. 630 (S. D. N. Y., 1915).
78 S. S. White Dental Supply Co. v. Sibley, supra note 74.
Norris v. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co., 271 Fed. 536 (Md. 1921).
1 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 23 Sup.
Ct. 298, 47 L. Ed. 460 (1903); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman,
189 Fed. 215 (C. C. M. D. Pa., 1911); J. H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro,
227 Fed. 957 (S. D. N. Y., 1915); Stecher Lith. Co. v. Dunston Lith. Co.,
233 Fed. 601 (W. D. N. Y., 1916).
1 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 249.
K. L. J.-4
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from the plaintiff's copyrighted advertisement.8 2 And this is
true even though the defendant's goods were in fact designed
from plaintiff's copyrighted illustrations; the plaintiff cannot, by
copyrighting his advertisements, create a monopoly in the manu-
facture or sale of unpatentable articles.8 3
The test of infringement of a copyrighted advertisement or
label is whether the defendant's label would mislead an ordina-
rily prudent purchaser into buying the defendant's goods for
those of the plaintiff.8 4 It is not necessary, to constitute infringe-
ment, that the infringing advertisement be identical with that
which is infringed; paraphrasing may be an infringement, or,
in the case of pictures, a picture which is substantially similar
although not an exact copy of the copyrighted picture.8 Nor is
it necessary that the defendant have copied the whole compo-
sition; a copy of a substantial part constitutes infringement,8 6
and where the plaintiff has copyrighted an entire catalogue, each
cut contained therein is entitled to protection.8 7 Separate pub-
lications of the same copyrighted advertising matter by the same
defendant amount to separate infringements, one for each
publication.88 Unauthorized use by a jobber of a manufacturer's
copyrighted print for the purpose of advertising the manu-
facturer's own product has been held an infringement of the
copyright; had the print been merely registered as a trade mark,
the use would have been proper.8 9
Remedies given by the Copyright Act for infringement are
threefold: injunction, accounting for profits arising out of the
infringement, and damages.90 Where actual damages cannot be
ascertained, then, under the statute, damages are such "as to
8 Collender v. Griffith, Fed. Cas. No. 3,000 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1873);
Lamb v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 39 Fed. 474 (C. C. W. D.
Mich., 1889); National Cloak and Suit Co. v. Standard Mail Order Co.,
191 Fed. 528 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1911).
13Lamb v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., supra note 82.84William Faehndrich, Inc. v. Wheeler Riddle Cheese Co., 34 F. (2d)
43 (E. D. N. Y., 1929).
8Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A.
8th, 1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 666, 53 Sup. Ct. 224, 77 L. Ed. 574
(1932).
r-Ibid.
81 Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Giuliani Statuary Co., 189 Fed. 90
(C. C. Minn., 1911).
"I L. A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100,
39 Sup. Ct. 194, 63 L. Ed. 499 (1919).
9 Golden Rule, Inc. v. B. V. D. Co., 242 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
U. S. C. A., tit. 17, §25.
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to the court shall appear just" in the particular case, consider-
ing the nature of the copyright, the circumstances of the
infringement, and the like.91 In such a case, the compensation
to which the plaintiff is entitled is virtually within the discretion
of the trial judge.92
In awarding these remedies, the "clean hands" doctrine of
equity has, at least once, been applied. In Stone and McCarrick
v. Dugan Piano Co. 3 the plaintiff, having copyrighted a book of
advertisements constituting a selling scheme to be used by dealers
in connection with sales of pianos, which advertisements con-
tained extravagant statements calculated to mislead the public,
sued for an injunction, an accounting, and damages for infringe-
ment, The court dismissed the bill, saying that "if in any case
mere advertisements are copyrightable, the law should extend
its protection to those only that speak the truth, and certainly
not to that class of advertising matter the effect of which is to
mislead and deceive the public." The decision seems sound and
in accordance with equitable principles, although it appears to
have no specific statutory authorization.
VIII
To what extent copyright is utilized as a device to protect
advertising, the writer is not prepared to say. Most advertising,
no doubt, is not copyrighted at the present time, although there
is probably some reason to believe that the proportion of copy-
righted advertising is increasing, and that it will continue to do
so in the future. If so, and the law of advertising copyrights
continues to develop, will it be too much to expect that the
doctrine of Stoce and McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Co. will be
followed, and that the owners of such copyrights will be required
to come into court with clean hands?
1lbAW., L. A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., supra
note 88.
12 No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Norris, 277 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 4th,
1921).
,3 220 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915).
